Dynamic Coordination Failures and the Efficiency of the Firm by Goyal, S. (Sanjeev) & Janssen, M.C.W. (Maarten)
JOURNAL OF 
Economic Behavior 
ELSEVIER 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
Vol. 28 (1995) 223-239 
& Organization 
Dynamic coordination failures and the 
efficiency of the firm 
Sanjeev Goyal a, Maarten C.W. Janssen b** 
a Econometric Institate, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
b Department of Microeconomics, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands 
Received 20 April 1993; revised 21 November 1994 
Abstract 
This paper examines the role of coordination devices such as work norms in creating 
and sustaining inefficient organizational practices in firms, in a dynamic environment. The 
role of signalling norms and product market competition in alleviating such inefficiencies is 
also examined. In particular, we show that Coumot competition may increase the ineffi- 
ciency of organizational practices. 
JEL classification: C72; D21; D82 
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1. Introduction 
In many organizations activities of different employees (or, at a higher level, 
departments) have to be geared to one another: a certain number of tasks have to 
be accomplished and it is often more important to ensure that all these tasks will 
be performed than to ensure that particular persons perform particular tasks. Of 
course, one allocation of activities to individual employees is often better than 
another, but any agreement as to who does what is to be preferred to no agreement 
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at all. Such an agreement might be called a work norm or an organization code. 
As organizations are confronted with an environment that changes, the best 
agreement might change from period to period. The issue we are interested in here 
is whether individual employees will have adequate incentives to be responsive to 
such changes. This question is examined in the context of a simple model of a 
worker-managed firm. 
Workers (departments) in the firm are modelled as engaged in interconnected 
tasks which may be represented by a coordination game. The game has two 
equilibria which are Pareto-ranked. We introduce the idea that the firm is 
characterized by a work norm which helps to solve the coordination problem. The 
work norm asks workers to perform specific tasks (see, MCnard, 1995) and acts as 
a kind of convention (as in Lewis, 1969). We do not study the question of how the 
norm comes into existence. Instead, we concentrate on the role of the work norm 
over time. We consider a dynamic environment in which due to changes within a 
firm or in a firm’s environment, the stage game equilibrium that was the more 
efficient one at one point in time might become inefficient. We consider situations 
in which this change is privately observed by one worker and start the analysis by 
examining whether the work norm will be replaced if it supports a stage-game 
inefficient outcome. 
The first observation is that once a work norm is in place there is an inherent 
tendency for it to persist even after it is known to be inefficient. This is due to the 
fact that a pre-existing convention, albeit inefficient, still constitutes an equilib- 
rium of the stage game and if the uninformed worker is not willing to change his 
behavior the informed worker has no incentive to go in for costly signalling. 
This observation motivates our analysis of signalling norms, i.e., examination 
of equilibria in which communication of change has an impact on future actions 
via a change of beliefs of the uninformed workers. Our second observation 
concerns the welfare properties of such equilibria. It is shown that all equilibria 
that conform to signalling norms can sustain inefficient outcomes as well. In other 
words, despite the existence of signalling norms, which imply suitable responses 
by all workers to signals, the incentive to communicate change in stage-game 
pay-offs might be inadequate. The intuition for this is simple: the cost of change, 
which is reflected in the loss of some pay-offs in the period of transition, exceeds 
the benefits (due to an increase in future pay-offs) for the informed player. If one 
were to interpret a work norm as a “routine” in the sense of Nelson and Winter 
(1982), then this result provides a formal defense for their claim that routines are 
relatively inflexible. 
This result leads us to examine of the issue of dynamic efficiency, i.e., a 
concept of efficiency which incorporates the idea of “switching/communication” 
costs. Our principal result says that all equilibria which conform to stage-game and 
signalling norms could sustain dynamically inefficient outcomes if individual 
interests diverge from common interests of the organization. 
This conclusion from the analysis of the single firm motivates an analysis of the 
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role of product market competition, a la Coumot, in reducing the dynamic 
inefficiency of organizations. Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that such compe- 
tition may have the effect of actually exacerbating inefficiency. The intuition for 
this result is that a firm can capture more of the benefits of a change in a 
monopolistic situation than in a more competitive market. 
The issues we address in this paper, most notably the consequences of the 
presence of work norms and conventions, have been discussed in the literature on 
firms and organizations informally and the purpose of this paper is to argue that 
these issues can be formalized in a simple way using the framework of (repeated) 
coordination games. We would like to emphasize that the present paper does not 
aim to make a contribution to game theory as such, nor does the model presented 
claim to be a realistic description of organizations. So, for instance, we abstract 
from conflicts of interest and the presence of hierarchies in organizations. We 
believe, however, that the results on inefficiency we obtain are likely to obtain in 
more complicated models of organizations in which conflicts of interest and 
hierarchies are also incorporated. 
Our analysis is related to several strands in the economics literature. We briefly 
discuss some of these connections now. The possibility of inefficiencies within 
organizations was recognized early on in Leibenstein’s concept of X-efficiency 
(see Leibenstein, 1966). In later work, Leibenstein (19881, he also examines the 
role of coordination conventions in organizations in sustaining suboptimal out- 
comes. This argument is also related to a critique that has been made on a 
so-called functionalist explanation of organizations, or more generally of institu- 
tions. The critique (see, e.g., Basu et al., 1987 and Bianchi, 1995) argues that even 
though organizations might be efficient at some point in time, their existence at 
some moment need not imply that they are efficient at that particular point in time. 
Our formulation of asymmetric information concerning the true pay-off matrix 
may be interpreted as one of the potential reasons why such inefficiencies may 
persist. 
The impact of competition on reducing managerial slack has also been studied 
by others (e.g., Hart, 1983 and Scharfstein, 1989). The model we study, however, 
identifies the slack not in the potential work-shirking indulged in by imperfectly 
monitored managers, but in coordination costs. To distinguish the two we use the 
expression organizational slack as against their terminology of managerial slack. 
Moreover, they look at competitive product markets, whereas we consider 
oligopolistic markets. Our paper may thus be seen as complementary to the line of 
research followed in those papers. 
Our paper is also related to issues in optimal mechanism/contract design. In 
particular, the results on dynamic inefficiency raise the question whether there 
exists an optimal remuneration scheme for workers which can overcome incentive 
problems arising out of asymmetric information. We show that such a scheme 
exists in the context of our model, but we argue that since organizations typically 
face a whole range of potential changes in their environment, many of which 
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might be unknown at the moment the remuneration scheme is decided upon, it 
would be prohibitively expensive to write out a scheme that covers all possible 
contingencies. The results on dynamic inefficiency of equilibrium outcomes may 
then be viewed as implications of incomplete contracting (for a survey on contract 
theory, see Hart and HolmstrBm, 1987). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and 
shows how equilibria that conform to stage-game and signalling conventions 
might sustain stage-game inefficient outcomes. (A more formal presentation of 
some of this material can be found in Goyal and Janssen, 1992). This section also 
discusses the issue of dynamic ex-post inefficiency in the context of the basic 
model. Section 3 studies the role of Cournot competition in reducing organiza- 
tional slack. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The model 
This section consists of five subsections. In subsection 2.1 we describe the 
basic model in some detail. Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 present the results on 
stage-game and dynamic efficiency, respectively, while the last two subsections 
discuss the robustness of our results to the assumptions we make about the way 
workers are paid (the remuneration scheme) and the way we model communica- 
tion costs. 
2.1. A simple model 
Consider a worker-managed firm in which two workers have to decide on their 
effort levels. Each of them can choose to shirk or to work hard. These options are 
represented by xi = 1 or 2, where xi is the effort level of worker i. ’ The 
production function is represented by 
i 
(Y if min(x:,,x,) = 1 
‘= p ifmin(x,,x,)=2 
where y is total production of the firm and (~,/3 > 0. It is further assumed that 
each of the workers gets a share of total production. This share is denoted by yi, 
where yi = (xi/x1 + x,)y. Thus, each worker is paid according to his relative 
effort level. (In subsection 2.4 we discuss the role of this remuneration scheme in 
our analysis). Finally, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility (pay-off) index of 
worker i is simply represented by Q(xi,x_ i) = yi - yxi, where y > 0. It is thus 
assumed that an individual worker’s direct utility from a low effort level is 
’ One can also interpret “1” and “2” as two different activities. 
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positive. On the other hand, he realizes that shirking might have a negative impact 
on the output that accrues to them. The fact that individual activities have to be 
geared to each other is formally described in the production technology. A model 
of this kind has been proposed by Bryant (1983) to analyze macroeconomic 
coordination failures and by Vega-Redondo (1993) to study the role of “organiza- 
tional culture”. It has also been used in an experimental setting by van Huyck et 
al. (1990) and Cooper et al. (1990). 
The relation between effort and utility levels is summarized in the table below. 
The first number gives the utility index of worker 1. A coordination game results 
if Ur(2,l) < U,(l,l) and U,(1,2) < I&(2,2), i.e., if (Y < 6y and 2a + 6y < 3p. In 
what follows we will assume that this is the case. 
The fact that the environment of the firm may change is represented in the 
simplest possible way. The above coordination game is played a certain number of 
times. The parameter o is fixed throughout the game; the parameter j3 may take 
on two values, j3r and &, where &, > /3,. At some point in time the value of /3 
may change from p1 to &. The values of j3t and & are such that before the 
change (xl,xZ) = (1,l) is the more efficient stage-game equilibrium and after the 
change (x,,x,) = (2,2) is more efficient, i.e., (Y + 27 > fir and (Y + 2-y < &. 
Furthermore, we assume that the change is observed privately by one of the 
players. We think that this is the most usual case in organizations since, due to 
specialization on a specific task, each worker has specific knowledge about certain 
aspects of the organization or about the environment. For example, someone 
working in the purchasing department knows more about the changes that have 
occurred in the (quality or the prices of the) intermediary products the firm 
potentially might buy than someone working in the production department and so 
on. The problem for the worker and the organization is then how this private 
information can be transferred to the other workers so that a more efficient way of 
production will be established. Here we assume that the only way of transferring 
information about change to the other worker is through signalling by means of 
actions and we will analyze the conditions under which the informed worker will 
signal the change in pay-offs. This is a simplifying assumption; similar considera- 
tions appear, however, if we consider costly “verbal” communication (see 
subsection 2.5 below). 
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The periods in our model can be divided in three: the periods before the change 
occurs, the period of the change and the periods after the change. We start our 
analysis at the moment that an agreement (or work norm) of how to play the initial 
game has been reached, i.e., we do not analyze the question how the initial 
agreement has come about. The work norm suggests an action for both workers as 
long as they have not observed a change in the game or a change in the action of 
their co-worker. 
2.2. Stage-game efficiency 
In the above framework, there are three potential sources of inefficiencies. A 
(trivial) first source of inefficiency arises when the initial agreement initially 
supports an inefficient outcome. More concretely, the agreement is inefficient if it 
suggests that workers choose xi = 2 before the change has actually occurred. In 
what follows we will rule out this type of inefficiency by postulating that the 
initial agreement in the organization suggests actions that support efficient stage 
game play, i.e. the initial agreement is to play xi = 1. 
The other two sources of inefficiency have to do with the conditions under 
which the informed worker is willing to signal the change to the other worker. 
Given that the initial agreement is to play (l,l), an informed worker can signal the 
change in the production process by playing xi = 2. The uninformed worker will 
see that the informed worker has changed his action either by observing the action 
of the informed worker directly or by observing the change in utility that accrues 
to him. The uninformed worker can react in two ways to the change of action of 
his co-worker. Either he interprets the change as a mistake and continues to work 
at the low effort level or he interprets the change of action as a signal that a 
change in the production process has taken place and that coordinating on the high 
effort level is now more efficient. In the second alternative, he may switch effort 
levels from the next period onwards. Note that the existence of an initial work 
norm is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for the uninformed worker to 
be able to interpret the change of action as a signal: without the work norm he 
would probably not even have noticed that the other worker has taken an unusual 
action. 
The second source of inefficiency is then the possibility that the uninformed 
worker interprets a change of action of the other worker as a mistake. If he does 
so, there is no incentive for the informed worker to signal, because the uninformed 
worker will keep playing xi = 1 and the best response of the informed worker to 
this strategy is to play xi = 1 as well. This argument depends on the fact that 
(x1,x,) = (1,l) remains an equilibrium in the new stage game. Note that this holds 
independently of the value of &. 
Organizations operating in a dynamic environment often develop gradually 
some procedures for communicating or signalling change. We incorporate this 
feature in our model by formulating a so-called signalling norm. The signalling 
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norm says that workers believe that their colleague-worker will change actions 
only if he (the colleague) has good reasons to do so, i.e., he has observed a change 
to the good in stage-game pay-offs. In particular, the uninformed worker will 
interpret a change in actions of the colleague-worker as a signal that the pay-offs 
have changed. In order to illustrate the intuition of signalling norms, we will 
simplify the exposition even further by concentrating the analysis on two periods: 
a first period in which the change in pay-off might have occurred and the period 
immediately after that. For simplicity it is assumed that future pay-offs are not 
discounted, i.e., the discount factor S equals 1. ’ The extensive form of this two 
period game is given below. 
The extensive form describes the situation in which worker 1 is the informed 
worker. When he has to decide on his first action he knows whether or not the 
change in pay-off has occurred. When worker 2 decides on his action he is 
uninformed about the action of worker 1 and about whether or not the change has 
happened in that period. After the first period, the utility level is revealed to the 
workers and they also remember their own last action. When worker 2 has to 
move in the last period, he can infer which action his co-worker has chosen in the 
previous period, but he still does not know whether the change in the environment 
has taken place and he is also unaware of the action chosen by the informed 
worker in the second period. This explains why the information sets are as 
depicted in Fig. 1. 
We are now in the position to discuss the third source of inefficiency. The 
work norm suggests the action x1 = 1 in the two periods. It is clear that the 
informed worker does not change actions if the pay-offs do not change. Hence, the 
workers will follow the work norm and this will give a total pay-off of (Y - 2-y to 
the workers. If the pay-offs have changed the informed worker might wish to 
signal this change by choosing x1 = 2 in the period of change. As the uninformed 
worker does not have reasons to change actions, he will follow the work norm by 
playing x2 = 1 in the period the change has occurred. 3 Thus, a change in action 
results in an initial loss in pay-off. A change in actions is thus only beneficial if 
the future gains are large enough. The signalling norm helps the workers to 
coordinate actions when it is clear that one of them does not follow the initial 
work norm. The argument is the following. When worker 2 is at information set 
III he knows that worker 1 has deviated in period 1 from the work norm. The 
signalling norm then says that worker 2 believes that worker 1 has had good 
reasons to deviate. Looking at the utility worker 1 can get when information set III 
is reached, one can see that there is only one action combination which could yield 
’ The general argument of the paper holds true if the game is played for more than two periods and 
future pay-offs are discounted. 
3 More formally, in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium that conforms to the work norm and the signalling 
norm, the uninformed worker does not switch actions in the period of change if the probability of 
change is small enough. 
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a higher pay-off than (Y - 2-y. This action combination is (xl,xz) = (2,2) and the 
pay-off to worker 1 is (4c~ + 3&)/6 - 47. The only good reason worker 1 could 
have had to deviate from the work norm is that (4a + 3&j/6 - 47 > a! - 2-y. 
Worker 2 can then infer that worker 1 will choose x1 = 2 in the second period. 
Given this inference, worker 2 should also choose x2 = 2 in the second period. 
Using the signalling norm, worker 1 knows that 2 will play x2 = 2 in the second 
period when he deviates in the fust period. So, he will change actions if 
& > 2a/3 + 47. The signalling norm will, however, not help the workers to 
move to the more efficient stage-game quilibrium in case & < 2a/3 + 47. 
Thus, in spite of the existence of signalling norms, if (Y + 2-y < & < 2 a/3 + 4 y 
players will persist in playing (l,l), which is stage-game inefficient. Thus, the 
third source of inefficiency is the lack of incentives for the informed worker to 
signal change. In the next subsection we define dynamic ex-post efficiency and 
consider the question whether the signalling norm will ensure such efficiency. 
The above argument may be summarized in the following result. 
Proposition 1 
(a) If &~(a+2y, 2/3 (Y + 4-y), then a stage-game inefficient mode of 
behaviour may persist despite the existence of signalling norms. 
(b) If & 2 2 /3& + 4 y, then signalling norms facilitate a switch to stage-game 
eficient outcomes. 
Stage-game inefficiencies might persist in firms in which the workers face a 
coordination problem because individual workers may have inadequate incentives 
to communicate (signal) private information. Signalling norms reduce the extent of 
stage-game inefficiency, but do not eliminate it. 
At the end of this subsection it is worth noting that the argument using 
signalling norms is closely related to what is called “forward induction” in the 
game theoretic literature (cf., Van Damme, 1989). 4 By deviating from the work 
norm it is as if the informed worker sends the following message: “look, we could 
have got (Y - 2y if I would not have deviated. I know that you do not know 
whether there has been a change and which action I will take in the second period. 
However, the fact that I have deviated and that there is only one action that yields 
a higher pay-off than we would have obtained otherwise should give you some 
indication what I will do. So, think well now and decide accordingly”. 5 For this 
argument to hold true, it is essential that there exists a work norm that initially 
coordinates the workers’ actions. The work norm acts as a kind of “sure outside 
option”. 
4 A difference between the concept of forward induction as formulated in Van Damme (1989) and 
the argument put forward above is that in that paper forward induction is restricted to proper subgames, 
whereas in the present context the idea of forward induction applies to information sets. 
’ This is an adaptation of Van Damme (19891, p. 484. 
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2.3. Dynamic ex-post ejjficiency 
So far we have examined the ex-post stage-game efficiency of equilibria. Such 
a notion of efficiency is not sensitive to the costs of transition from one norms 
regime to another. A natural way to extend the idea of stage-game efficiency to 
incorporate switching or signalling costs is to consider a dynamic notion of 
efficiency. Since our concern is with inefficiencies at the level of the organization, 
we will focus on properties of aggregate outcomes. We say that an outcome is 
dynamically ex-post efficient if there does not exist some other feasible outcome 
which yields weakly greater aggregate pay-offs in all states of the world and 
strictly greater pay-offs in some state of the world. The main point of the 
following analysis is to show that despite the existence of signalling norms, 
equilibrium outcomes may be dynamically ex-post inefficient. 
We need some additional notation: let S = { &,&} be the set of possible states 
and U,,(s) be the utility of agent i in period k in state SCS. We define the 
organization’s aggregate pay-offs in period k and state s, Uk(s), as the sum of the 
worker’s utilities: U,(s) = U,,(s) + U,,(s) and the organization’s total aggregate 
pay-offs in state s, U(s), as U(s) = U,(s) + U,(s). Our concern is with dynamic 
ex-post efficiency and to define this more precisely, we need an understanding of 
the feasible outcomes. We shall say that a utility outcome {U(S))~~~ is feasible if 
there exists a strategy combination which can support it. In our context, the key 
point about strategy combinations is that in period 1 player 2 cannot condition on 
the true state, and in period 2 he can only condition on the true state if it has been 
revealed through actions and/or pay-offs in period 1. If we denote by xik(s) the 
action of worker i in period k in state s, then feasibility requires that xZ1( &) = 
xZ1( &) and that xZ2( &) = xZ2( &) if the true state is not revealed in period 1. 
An outcome {U(s)),,, is then said to be dynamically ex-post efficient if, and 
only if, there does not exist another feasible outcome {U’(s)},,, such that (i) 
U’(s) 2 U(s) for all s and (ii) U’(s) > U(s) for some s. 
The set of feasible outcomes is rather large, but a moment’s reflection reveals 
that there are only four really interesting strategy combinations when one investi- 
gates the efficiency of a particular outcome. For easy reference we state these four 
combinations here: 
(i) (VS, Vk, Vi, Xik(S) = 1) 
(ii) {Vs, XII(s) = X.J.7) = l;VS, X12(S) =X,,(S) = 2) 
(iii) {Vs, xrr(s) = xzl(s) = 2; XJS) =x**(s) = 2 if, and only if, s = PZ) 
(iu) (xrl(s) = 2 if, and only if s = &; t/s, xzl(s) = 1; x12(s) =X&S) = 2 if, 
and only if, s = &I 
The first strategy combination refers to the status quo; the second refers to an 
unconditional change of actions in the second period; the third combination allows 
the players to condition their strategies on the true state, because they choose 
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action combination (2,2) in period 1; the fourth combination, finally, incorporates 
the notion of signalling norms. 
Straightforward comparisons of utility levels under these four cases enables us 
to characterize fully the nature of outcomes that signalling norms can sustain. For 
expositional clarity, we present the cases of a! > 3-y and (Y < 3-y separately in the 
two propositions below. 
Proposition 2. Suppose (Y < 3~. Then 
(a) if & I (Y + 3y, then signalling norms sustain combination (i), which is 
dynamically efficient. 
(6) if & E((Y + 3y, 2/3o + 4~1, then signalling norms sustain combination (I), 
which is dynamically ineflcient. 
(c) if & > 2/3a + 4y, then signalling norms sustain combination (iv), which 
is dynamically effkient. 
Proposition 3. Suppose (Y > 3~. Then 
(a) if & I 2 /3a + 4y, then signalling norms sustain combination (i), which is 
dynamically efficient. 
(b) if &e(2/3o+4 y, CY + 3y], then signalling norms sustain combination 
(iv), which is dynamically inefficient. 
(c) if & > (Y + 3y, then signalling norms sustain combination (iv), which is 
dynamically efficient. 
These results follow quite directly from the following observations. Using 
signalling norms, switching from action combination (1,l) to (2,2) involves a 
signal by the informed player which costs an extra unit of y in period 1. Recall 
from subsection 2.2 that action combination (2,2) is stage game superior to (1,l) 
if, and only if, & > (Y + 2~. This implies that switching is dynamically efficient 
if, and only if, /I2 > (Y + 3~. Parts (b) of propositions 2 and 3 then follow from 
the fact that the informed player will signal if, and only if, & > 2/3c~ + 4~. 
Thus, signalling norms can sustain excessive change (Proposition 3b) as well as 
too little change relative (Proposition 2b) to what is organizationally optimal. 
2.4. The role of specific remuneration schemes 
In our analysis, we have considered a specific remuneration scheme in which 
workers are paid according to their effort level. Given our results, a natural 
question that arises is: what is the optimal remuneration scheme and does this 
optimal scheme sustain dynamic inefficiency? Moreover, if the answer to the last 
question is negative then what is the significance of our earlier analysis? This 
subsection addresses these issues. 
In general, individual i’s remuneration depends on his effort level and the 
effort level of the other worker: yi(xl,xZ), i = 1,2. A feasible remuneration 
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scheme is a scheme such that y,(x1,x2) +y,(x,,x,) _<y(x,,x,). It is easily seen 
that the scheme 
Yi(XlJ2) = i[Y< Xi,+) +y(Xi-X-J] i= 1,2, (2.1) 
is feasible. We will next show that given scheme 2.1 and signalling norms the 
informed worker will initiate a switch from (x1,x,) = (1,l) to (xl,xZ) = (2,2) if, 
and only if, pZ 2 (Y + 3y, i.e., if and only if, such a switch is dynamically 
efficient. 
Recall from above that an informed worker switches (and signals change in p> 
if, and only if, pay-offs from doing so exceed the pay-offs of remaining with 
action combination (1,l). Given scheme (2.1) and the presence of signalling norms 
this means that an informed worker will switch if, and only if, 2(1/2 (Y - y) < 
(l/2 cy + l/2 y - 2y) + (l/2 p2 - 2y), which is equivalent to & > (Y + 3y. It 
then follows from the analysis in the previous subsection that remuneration 
scheme (2.1) guarantees dynamic efficiency. This result is not very surprising: 
dynamic inefficiency can only arise in cases in which the interest of the organiza- 
tion does not coincide with the interest of the individual workers. Remuneration 
scheme (2.1) is constructed in such a way that the interest of the organization and 
the informed worker always coincide. 
The existence of remuneration scheme (2.1) seems to question the robustness of 
Proposition 2.3. In our view, organizations typically face a variety of uncertainties, 
many of which may not even be foreseen at the moment a remuneration scheme is 
contracted upon. This suggests that generally contracts that cover all possible 
contingencies will be very difficult (and prohibitively expensive) to write out and 
implement. For a given incomplete contract, there will exist contingencies under 
which the incentives for the informed worker do not coincide with the interests of 
the organization. Our analysis in subsections 2.1-2.3 implicitly assumes the 
existence of such uncovered contingencies and this motivates the simple remunera- 
tion scheme that we study. 
2.5. On the cost of communication 
In the analysis so far we have assumed that the workers cannot verbally 
communicate with each other. When dealing with organizations this is, of course, 
a crude assumption to make. However, much of the above analysis remains valid 
when we allow for costly or noisy communication. In firms, but also in other 
types of organizations (think, for example, of universities) communication takes 
place through meetings or via mail. Meetings (as we all know) are costly, because 
they divert the time of employees away from “directly” productive activities. The 
assumption that communication is costly reflects these losses of productive time. 
Mail, on the other hand, is less costly, but also less effective (i.e., more noisy). 
Letters are not carefully read and the sender of a letter cannot be sure that the 
information he sends is actually received. 
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In the labour-managed firm described above the benefits of a meeting are 
identical to the benefits of the signalling norm: the information of a pay-off 
change becomes publicly known and the most appropriate combination of actions 
will be taken. The cost of a meeting may, however, be larger than the cost of the 
signalling norm. This is because signalling by changing actions still yields a 
positive output level in the period of change, while the production process may 
have to be stopped uring a meeting. The exact condition for the signalling norm 
to be more efficient depends, of course, on how many units of production time a 
meeting costs and how much effort has to be put into it. It is clear, however, that 
once the costs of a meeting are taken into account similar considerations apply to 
the decision whether or not to call for a meeting as to whether or not to signal by 
changing actions. To illustrate this, in the next section, on the role of competitive 
pressure, we consider a model which explicitly incorporates communication costs. 
3. Competitive pressure on organizations 
This section examines the extent to which competition can eliminate dynamic 
ex-post inefficiencies in organizations. We will consider the Coumot form of 
competition. 6 For expositional simplicity and following up on the argument 
concerning communication possibilities, we will reformulate the nature of change 
in the model. We will, however, retain the basic conceptual apparatus concerning 
norms (conventions) and equilibria that conform to these norms. 
Consider a firm in which two workers have to coordinate their activities to 
produce some output. There are two possible production processes, denoted by 0 
and 1 respectively. The marginal cost of production by means of process 0 is c0 in 
all periods. The marginal costs of process 1 may change over time (due to (say) a 
variable quality of some of the inputs). Initially, marginal costs of process 1 are c, 
and ci > c,,, i.e., initially process 1 is less attractive. Later, the marginal cost of 
process 1 might be reduced to c2 and c2 < c,,, which would make process 1 the 
cheaper production technology. The firm faces a linear demand curve, represented 
by q = 1 -p, where q is the output level and p is the price. Thus, the optimal 
(monopoly) output level is denoted by (1 - ci)/2 and maximal profits are equal to 
(1 - Q/4. 
As in the previous section, there is a period in time at which marginal costs for 
process 1 might switch from cr to c2 and we consider a two period case with the 
period in which change might occur and the period immediately following that. 
We shall assume that before the change the firm coordinates on process 0. The 
6 An alternative way to model competition is in terms of the Bertrand model of price competition. 
Here, we consider the Coumot model since (for reasons of simplicity) we want to look at a 
homogeneous good market and within this context the Bertrand model is not very illuminating. 
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change is observed privately (say, by the supplies department in the firm) and is 
not common knowledge. To make the fact commonly known requires some 
communication among workers. This communication is costly and we assume that 
it costs cF > 0 to make the change commonly known and to switch to the more 
efficient process (if the change has actually taken place). Finally, for convenience, 
we assume that it takes one period of time to complete the change, i.e., if the 
change is initiated in period t it is completed only by the beginning of period 
t + 1. In line with the analysis of the previous section, we also restrict attention to 
equilibria in which players conform to stage-game norms in the absence of 
communication. 
What are the conditions for switching to process l? In other words, when does 
the informed worker communicate his private knowledge. To analyze this ques- 
tion, we specify that the informed worker gets half of total profits and has to incur 
the fraction (Y of the communication costs. 7 Furthermore, for simplicity, we 
assume workers do not discount future pay-offs. If the cost structure of process 1 
changes, the individual pay-off from communicating this change is given by 
(3.1) 
Likewise, the pay-off to the informed worker of not communicating is given by 
(1 - c&4. 
Thus, communication occurs if, and only if, 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
It is dynamically ex-post efficient, in the sense defined in the previous section, 
to switch to process 1, if and only if, cF I 1/4[(1 - c2)’ - (1 - cJ2]. Accord- 
ingly, for (Y > l/2 there always exist parameter values of cF, cO and c2 such that 
no switching takes place even though it is dynamically efficient to do so. The level 
of inefficiency is measured by the difference in pay-off the organization would 
receive from switching and the pay-off it receives from not switching and is equal 
to (1 - c,j2/4 - (1 - ~,)~/4 - cF. This dynamic ex-post inefficiency is due to 
the mismatch between the incentives of the informed worker and the organization. 
We now explore the role of competitive pressure in mitigating this dynamic 
ex-post efficiency. Competitive pressure is modelled via Coumot competition. We 
introduce a second firm with a cost structure such that the per unit cost is c2. In 
the analysis we shall assume, implicitly, that the cost structure of the second firm, 
7 As long as the interest of the informed worker does not coincide fully with the interest of the 
organization, other remuneration schemes would yield conclusions similar to the ones we reach below. 
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embodied in c2 does not reveal any information to firm l’s workers about their 
own cost structure, i.e., the cost structures of the two firms are uncorrelated. * 
The question we are interested in is: What is the effect of the presence of a 
second firm on the incentives for change in firm l? To examine this question, we 
have to look at the pay-offs of the informed worker, given that the firms play a 
Coumot-Nash equilibrium in the market game. In case of communication this 
pay-off is easily calculated to be 
;[(1+~~-2c,)~/9+(1-c,)~/9] --cF. 
Likewise, the pay-off from not communicating is given by 
(1 + c2 - 2~,)~/9. 
Thus, the informed worker would communicate if, and only if, 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
As before, if (Y > l/2, then there exist parameter values of cF, cO and c2 such 
that no switching takes place even if it is dynamically efficient to do so. In the 
competition case the level of inefficiency is equal to (1 - c,j2/9 - (1 + c2 
- 2c,j2/9 - cF. 
The competition and the monopoly case can be compared by looking at the 
conditions for switching to the more efficient technology. Thus, we need to look at 
the following difference of terms: 
[(1-~,)~/‘4-(l-c~)~,‘4] -[(l-~,)~,‘9-(1+~,-2~,)~/9]. 
(3.7) 
Expression (3.7) can be simplified to 
-&-co-c,)(c,-c,)-d/9(1-c,)(c,-c,) 
Since c2 < cO < 1, both terms are positive. Applying this result to a comparison of 
Eqs. (3.3) and (3.6) reveals that if the informed worker would switch to the more 
8 If the cost structures of the two firms are strongly correlated, the workers in the firm under 
consideration will be able to infer from the profits they receive in period 1 that technology 1 has 
become more efficient. This will have the effect that the workers can wait until the second period and if 
they observe a change in period 1 profits (from what they have “previously” been earning), then both 
the informed and uninformed worker can switch actions in period 2 without incurring any communica- 
tion costs. These observations, along with the analysis that follows, suggest that incentives for initiating 
change for the informed worker will be higher in the case where costs are uncorrelated. 
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efficient technology in the Cournot competition case, he would also switch in the 
monopolistic case, but not vice versa. In other words, there are values of cF such 
that switching to the more efficient technology takes only place in the monopoly 
case. Accordingly, the “new” technology should be more efficient (cl should be 
lower) to make switching beneficial in the competition case than in the monopoly 
case. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, Cournot competition may actually increase the 
scope for inefficiency in firms. 
The intuition behind this result is that in the case of a monopoly, a firm can 
capture more of the benefits of a change than in the case of competition. This 
result is related to the well-known Schumpeterian argument in the literature on 
innovation that a monopolist might have greater incentives to innovate than a firm 
in a competitive market (cf., Arrow, 1962). 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the role of coordination devices such as work norms 
in creating and sustaining inefficient work practices in firms, in a dynamic 
environment. For certain parameter values, our analysis suggests that once such 
work norms are in place, there may be an inherent tendency for them to persist, 
since the individual costs involved in instituting change may be too high relative 
to the individual benefits. For other parameter values, there may be excess 
momentum due to the fact that the individual incentives for change do not 
coincide with the interests of the organization. Furthermore, it is shown that 
product market competition a la Coumot may aggravate the inefficiency of firms. 
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